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This chapter argues that the near-universal exclusion from the academy of the Shakespeare 
Authorship Question (or SAQ) represents a significant but little-understood example of an internal 
threat to academic freedom. Using an epistemological lens, this chapter examines and critiques 
the invidious and marginalizing rhetoric used to suppress such research by demonstrating the 
extent to which it constitutes a pattern of epistemic vice: that, by calling skeptics “conspiracy 
theorists” and comparing them to Holocaust deniers rather than addressing the substance of their 
claims, orthodox Shakespeare academics risk committing acts of epistemic vice, injustice and 
oppression, as well as foreclosing potentially productive lines of inquiry in their discipline. To 
better understand this phenomenon and its implications, the chapter subjects selected statements 
to external criteria in the form of the Association of College and Research Libraries’ 2015 
Framework for Information Literacy for Higher Education, which provides a set of robust 
normative dispositions and knowledge practices for understanding the nature of the scholarly 
enterprise. The analysis reveals that the proscription against the Shakespeare Authorship Question 
constitutes an unwarranted infringement on the academic freedom not only of those targeted by 








Any substantive objection [to new ideas] is permissible and encouraged; the only 
exception being that ad hominem attacks on the personality or motives of the author are 
excluded. It does not matter what reason the proponent has for advancing his ideas or what 
prompts his opponents to criticize them: all that matters is whether the ideas are right or 
wrong, promising, or retrogressive. 
- Carl Sagan1 
 
The June 2019 issue of The Atlantic featured an essay by Elizabeth Winkler, “Was 
Shakespeare a Woman?” which, following a summary of the evidentiary weakness of the 
traditional attribution of the plays and poems of Shakespeare to the gentleman actor from 
Stratford-Upon-Avon, outlined the proposition that the poet Emilia Bassano might be a potential 
alternative candidate for their authorship (Winkler, 2019a). Anticipating controversy, the editors 
of The Atlantic let other Shakespeare experts weigh in on her claims, including Columbia 
University’s James Shapiro, who decried Winkler’s piece as “fiction” emerging from “an 
alternate universe, inhabited by conspiracy theorists…recycl[ing] stale and feeble arguments all 
too familiar to anyone who has dealt with this fringe movement” (Shapiro, 2019a, para. 2). 
Renowned Shakespearean actor Sir Mark Rylance, on the other hand, commended Winkler for 
her article and called out her critics for their vitriolic attacks, arguing that maintaining an open 
mind on the authorship of these works enriches our understanding of them (Rylance, 2019).  
                                                 
1 Sagan 1979, 82-83. 
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Much of the media response to Winkler’s piece was negative. For example, Dominic 
Green, writing in The Spectator, reiterated Shapiro’s accusation of “conspiracy theory” while 
offering a particularly distasteful analogy:  
The ‘case’ for anyone but Shakespeare is always a fantasy in pursuit of facts. Winkler’s 
article, like every case for Shakespeare not having been Shakespeare, repeatedly commits 
the elementary error of historical writing. Absence of evidence does not mean evidence of 
absence. It is strange that Shakespeare doesn’t refer to books in his will. But it doesn’t 
mean that he didn’t read. Hitler, after all, did not attend the Wannsee Conference. But that 
doesn’t mean he didn’t order the Holocaust (Green, 2019, para 6).  
By maligning such scholarship as “conspiracy theories” as well as levelling ad hominem 
attacks on those skeptical of the traditional Shakespeare biography, orthodox scholars and pundits 
such as Shapiro and Green are, in essence, levelling against them a charge of epistemic vice, or 
accusing them of illegitimate “practices and concepts relating to knowledge, understanding, 
certainty, belief [and] doubt” (Kidd, 2016, p. 181). As will be argued below, however, these 
charges are frequently imbued with highly prejudicial and stigmatizing rhetoric rather than 
substantive counterargument, amounting to acts of epistemic vice in their own right.  
In this chapter, we shall be examining this pattern of marginalization to demonstrate a key 
example of an infringement on academic freedom from within the academy, of attempts to silence 
legitimate discourse and prejudicially foreclose potentially fruitful avenues of scholarship. It will 
examine this case according to several relevant theoretical contexts concerning epistemic virtue 
before analyzing the rhetoric employed against Shakespeare skeptics according to an external 
criterion of scholarly soundness. The chapter concludes with the pedagogical reasons for 
welcoming the debate in the contemporary academy in the spirit of scholarly humility.    
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We must first establish essential terminology. The terms Stratfordian or orthodox refer to 
the traditional attribution of the plays and poems to William Shakspere of Stratford-Upon-Avon 
and believers in it, while criticism of the traditional attribution will be referred to as post-
Stratfordian, which would include the broad category anti-Stratfordian (agnostic skeptics) as well 
as advocates of particular candidates (e.g., Edward de Vere, 17th earl of Oxford, Francis Bacon, 
etc.). Furthermore, references to Shakespeare indicate the Author (whomever he was) while 
Shakspere denotes the gentleman from Stratford-Upon-Avon controversially assumed to be the 
author. 
Context: Internal Threats to Academic Freedom  
 
Debates over academic freedom in the 21st Century have grown increasingly complex and 
fraught as those on the political right have sought to target progressive academics both for their 
left-leaning, counterhegemonic political views (Wilson, 2008), or for what they see as the 
corrosive effects of policing language and ideas deemed offensive or harmful in the name creating 
“safe spaces” on campus (Williams, 2016). At the same time, critics on the left cite the undue 
influence of neoliberalism and corporatization on universities, and a concomitant reliance on 
external, corporate funding as a threat to academic freedom (Turk 2008). In fact, there have been 
accusations that university administrators have attempted to suppress findings unfriendly to their 
donors, while individual scholars, unable to resist the allure of such funding, have allowed it to 
compromise the integrity of their research (Washburn 2006). When forces external to the 
university seek to overtly impose limits on academic freedom on ideological bases, for many in 
the academy there is a clear imperative to reject these efforts, and scholars and their societies have 
proven quick to act: For example, the American Association of University Professors condemned 
conservative pundit David Horowitz’s attempts to legislate both federally and at state levels an 
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“Academic Bill of Rights” targeting the so-called “indoctrination” of students by left-leaning 
professors (American Association of University Professors, 2003).  
The dialogic landscape becomes less clearly defined when pressures to suppress and 
exclude certain forms of inquiry and course content come from within the academy, indeed, the 
professoriate itself. As James Turk of Canada’s Centre for Free Expression points out in the 
introduction to his book Academic Freedom in Conflict (2014), an important implied limitation on 
academic freedom is that faculty may not infringe upon the academic freedom of their colleagues. 
The fact remains, however, that such intramural policing does occur. Referring to such practices 
as “forum control,” Sullivan (2000) warns that denying unorthodox scholars access to a given 
discipline’s major publications and subjecting them to ridicule risks “cutting off lines of possible 
research and, perhaps, blinding itself to avenues of understanding” (p. 142).  
It is true that in some cases (as in, for example, experimentation on children or subjecting 
unknowing participants to potentially traumatizing experiences) such proscriptions are generally 
understood as perfectly justifiable on ethical, legal or moral grounds. There is a defensible 
consensus that some questions best remain unanswered: “forbidden knowledge” that may not be 
reasonably pursued without gravely compromising the legitimacy of the field in question – to say 
nothing of the humanity of the researchers themselves (Kempner, Merz & Bosk, 2011). On the 
other hand, taboos can also persist for purely ideological or paradigmatic reasons, and as a result 
of closed, circular systems of inquiry the margins of certain disciplines may become demarcated 
by significant “unknown knowns” reinforced by its members to maintain the status quo (Jackson, 
2012). Such, it shall be argued below, is the case with the question regarding the authorship of the 




Background: The Shakespeare Authorship Question.  
 
"There is a mystery about the identity of William Shakespeare. The mystery is this: why 
should anyone doubt that he was William Shakespeare, the actor from Stratford-upon-Avon?" So 
asks Jonathan Bate in his book The Genius of Shakespeare (1998, p. 65). Unfortunately for Bate, 
a few Stratfordians are willing to admit the reasons for doubt. David Ellis, in his The Truth About 
William Shakespeare: Fact, Fiction and Modern Biographies (2012), criticizes the Bard’s would-
be biographers for making up “facts” about their subject because so little is actually known about 
the Stratford gentleman. While convinced that Shakspere of Stratford was the author, he 
concludes that the Shakespearean biographical enterprise is a hopeless one. More damning still 
are the conclusions of Bruce Danner (2011) who writes that,  
[Shakespeare scholars] have failed to establish a clear and convincing portrait of 
Shakespeare, not merely to the popular audience, but to ourselves. Until we do, or can 
provide clear explanations for why we cannot, authorship conspiracy theories will persist, 
continuing to cast the “dark shadow[s]” that haunt our claims to knowledge (pp. 156-157).   
Despite the enduring public fascination with the debate regarding the authorship of the 
works of Shakespeare, investigation into it remains almost exclusively the domain of independent 
researchers, or academics associated with departments other than English literature. To doubt the 
attribution of the plays and poems to the apparently uneducated but miraculously gifted malt 
merchant of Stratford-Upon-Avon, or to pursue the question as an aspiring doctoral student or 
untenured faculty is to court career-ending disapprobation. Post-Stratfordian scholars and 
researchers are routinely subjected to rhetoric so extreme that the late Richmond Crinkley, 
director of programs at the Folger Shakespeare Library between 1969 and 1973, likened it to 
“some bizarre mutant racism” (Crinkley, 1985, p. 518). Post-Stratfordians are routinely dismissed 
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as “conspiracy theorists,” compared with “flat-Earthers,” creationists and even Holocaust deniers. 
This latter calumny is particularly egregious, and indeed dangerous. As Bryan Wildenthal (2016) 
explains,   
Does it not occur to these tenured “experts” just how reckless and harmful such 
comparisons are? …Leading academics do set a tone. Does it not occur to them how much 
it disrespects the victims of the worst (and best-documented) atrocity in human history? 
That such comparisons give aid and comfort to those who actually do deny…the reality of 
the Holocaust, by linking them to people with incomparably more reasonable and well-
founded doubts relating to the [Shakespeare Authorship Question], including many 
distinguished judges, scholars, and professionals in various fields? (p. 8) 
Mainstream orthodox Shakespeare scholars (and the pundits who regularly call upon them 
for comment in the media) routinely deal with the Authorship Question not by addressing the 
substance of post-Stratfordian criticisms but by questioning the sanity and motives of the doubters 
themselves. Samuel Schoenbaum’s remarks in his book Shakespeare’s Lives (1970) typify these 
attacks. He sees in doubters “a pattern of psychopathology ... paranoid structures of thought ... 
hallucinatory phenomena” and “descent, in a few cases, into actual madness” or at the very least 
the “manifestations of the uneasy psyche” (p. 608).   
This pattern of argumentation is known as the Bulverist fallacy – assuming a speaker to be 
wrong, and then ascribing their supposed error to psychological motivations, rather than 
addressing their claims (Lewis, 1970).2 As a rhetorical strategy it has proven quite effective over 
the years in marginalizing post-Stratfordian scholarship, excluding it from mainstream 
Shakespeare journals and relegating most of it to smaller, independent publishers or online 
                                                 
2 In his chapter “Bulverism” in God in the Dock (1970), Lewis makes up an imaginary figure, Ezekiel Bulver, whom 
he credits with inventing this rhetorical strategy.   
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venues.3 To create a legitimate dialogic space for such investigations in the academy, it is 
therefore essential that these strategies themselves be identified and delegitimized. 
Theory and Methods 
 
In this chapter, the attacks against proponents of the Shakespeare Authorship Question 
(SAQ) shall be framed theoretically as forms of epistemic injustice and oppression (Dotson, 2014; 
Fricker, 2007), before subjecting selected statements by Stratfordians to external, unrelated and 
disinterested criteria in the form of the Association of College and Research Libraries’ 
Framework for Information Literacy for Higher Education (ACRL Board of Directors, 2015), 
which provides a set of robust normative dispositions and knowledge practices for the academic 
researcher.  
Note that the belief in the Shakespeare of tradition per se does not concern us. Such 
arguments for and against have been set out extensively elsewhere (Anderson, 2006; Edmondson 
& Wells, 2013; Gilvary, 2018; McCrea, 2005; Ogburn, 1992; Price, 2001; Shahan & Waugh, 
2013). I am also cognizant of the possibility that the present argument will be compared to the 
cynical strategy employed by creationists to insinuate their agenda into the education system by 
“teaching the controversy” in the absence of actual scientific evidence supporting their argument. 
Such comparisons do not apply here: I allow the Stratfordian tradition has a valid place in the 
academy, but I am arguing that the exclusionary rhetoric used by some scholars to triumphantly 
assert the inviolability of the tradition and to denigrate dissident scholars has no place in the 
academy whatsoever. To better understand the nature of this rhetoric, we must first situate it in 
terms of theories of virtue epistemology. 
 
                                                 
3 For examples, see Hampton-Reeves, 2013 and Shapiro, 2010. 
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Theory: Epistemic Virtues and “Conspiracy Theories”  
Virtue epistemology (VE) is a branch of philosophy that seeks to understand the 
generation of knowledge by viewing individuals and groups as knowing agents. Where 
conventional epistemologists are concerned with what constitutes the construction of true beliefs 
at the individual level, VE introduces the roles personal traits and group dynamics play in these 
processes, and in their social reproduction. In other words, VE studies assist us in understanding 
the creation and maintenance of epistemological systems, which include “the situatedness of 
knowers, (2) the interdependence of our epistemic resources and (3) the resilience of our 
epistemological systems” (Dotson, 2014, p. 120).  
At the social level, virtue epistemologists consider the importance of luck (or one’s 
situatedness in the environment) in the ability of individuals or groups to acquire knowledge: that, 
given one’s fortunate circumstances it may take less effort to acquire knowledge while in other 
settings it is much more difficult or impossible to acquire certain forms of knowledge regardless 
of one’s abilities (Pritchard, 2014).4 We also need to acknowledge that “our epistemic 
socialisation is shaped by entrenched injustices, invidious stereotypes, and disruptive biases” 
(Kidd 2016, p. 190) which encourage epistemic vice. 
According to Kidd (2016), epistemic vices consist of poor epistemic conduct (deliberately 
ignoring evidence) and character (such as arrogance and dogmatism). To charge other parties of 
committing epistemic vice is to accuse them of possessing a blameworthy psychology such that 
they are closed-minded and acting in bad faith towards other knowers. However, when one’s 
                                                 
4 Without acknowledging their debt to virtue epistemologists per se, post-Stratfordians make this very argument 
against the Stratford mythology: that Shakspere of Stratford – regardless of any innate talent he might have possessed 
– was a deprived situated knower in a remote, bookless provincial town, far removed from an environment that might 
have equipped him to write the incredibly erudite and evidently aristocratic Shakespeare plays and poems (e.g., 
Ogburn 1992, chapters 1-4). 
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charge of vice is “ill-formed, poorly-reasoned, or evidentially empty” that, in itself, is an act of 
epistemic vice (p. 185).  
Since the most common epistemic vice charge in this case is that post-Stratfordians are 
promoting a “conspiracy theory” it is important that we examine this specific category from an 
epistemic perspective. According to Husting and Orr (2007), the labelling of any social or 
political critique as being “just a conspiracy theory” is a “pre-emption of the scholarly and 
investigation process” because it is universally accepted that conspiracies occur all the time 
(Watergate, Iran-Contra, Enron etc.), and each case requires that investigators carefully consider 
the available evidence (p. 131). The intended purpose of the charge is therefore to pejoratively 
call the speaker’s character into question, while mischaracterizing their claims and equating them 
with other, totally unrelated or clearly absurd claims (Husting and Orr, 2007).     
Husting and Orr (2007) further criticize political scientists and journalists for 
unquestioningly assuming the internal validity of the term “conspiracy theorist” and limiting their 
inquiries into asking why such people hold the beliefs they do, rather than addressing the 
substance of their claims, which are thus illegitimatized. The other rhetorical tool used against 
doubters is to then compare the conspiracy theory in question to a single or extreme example 
(e.g., Holocaust denial) to argue that all conspiracy theories may be dismissed out of hand. In this 
way, Husting and Orr argue, such writers “perform boundary maintenance” in a given discipline 
by “constructing the stigmatized other” (p. 141) such that “certain ways of knowing, thinking, and 
talking about power are encouraged while others are rendered abnormal” and public discourse is 
effectively policed (p. 144). In this view, the charge of “conspiracy theory” becomes a 
“mechanism of exclusion…by which critical questions and claims are symbolically 
delegitimized…a reframing device that neutralizes questions about power and motive while 
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turning the force of challenges back onto their speakers, rendering them unfit public interlocutors” 
(p. 146).  
When certain knowers are classified according to a prejudged category and have their 
knowledge and perspectives deemed to be outside the realm of acceptable discourse, they can 
then be said to have suffered epistemic injustice. In her 2007 book Epistemic Injustice: Power and 
the Ethics of Knowing, English philosopher Miranda Fricker describes how people may be 
“wronged specifically in [their] capacity as…knower[s]” (p. 20). Fricker describes this as 
testimonial injustice, in which a knower/teller is not believed by their audience owing to 
unwarranted prejudice against their social category.5 While she concentrates on people being 
dismissed and disqualified for reasons of race and gender, this form of injustice includes instances 
when a “new idea or hypothesis” is rejected by its intended audience owing to harmful 
stereotyping (p. 60). In any case, the result is that these speakers are systematically degraded as 
knowers and as people.   
Elaborating on Fricker’s work, Dotson (2014) speaks of epistemic oppression: when 
persistent exclusion from participating in a field of knowledge production hinders the knower’s 
ability to contribute to it – and effect change within it. In this credibility economy, certain classes 
of knowers are granted privileged default credibility while others are systematically deemed to be 
less credible. In order for those oppressed to be heard and understood, changes to the structures of 
epistemic power are required, that privileged credible knowers must be willing to lower the value 
of their own credibility.  
                                                 
5 Fricker’s second type, hermeneutical injustice, is a result of prejudice against broad social categories of knowers 
(e.g., race, ethnicity, sexuality) and does not apply to instances of marginalized knowledge practices (e.g., post-




The consequence for epistemological systems is, ironically, a form of epistemic injustice 
for its overzealous defenders. As Fricker (2007) points out, in cases of credibility excess, where a 
privileged knower is structurally granted epistemic authority, they can develop as a result 
“epistemic arrogance [such] that a range of epistemic virtues are put out of [their] reach, rendering 
[them] closed-minded, dogmatic, blithely impervious to criticism, etc.” (p. 20). As Pohlhaus 
(2017) puts it, “one cannot simply ignore other knowers and know well” (p. 16). One way to 
resist such a stance is to view open-mindedness as a second-order belief not about the belief itself 
but about your own fallibility as a believer: The thing one believes may be true, but as a knowing 
agent one is not infallible (Adler 2004).  
As we shall see below, these epistemic virtues are also some of the very ones advocated in 
the Association of College and Research Libraries’ Framework for Information Literacy for 
Higher Education (2015). 
Methods: The ACRL Framework for Information Literacy for Higher Education 
Officially adopted by the Association of College and Research Libraries (ACRL) in 2016, 
the Framework for Information Literacy for Higher Education frames information literacy (i.e., 
library instruction) as a social practice, rather than a set of discrete skills (ACRL Board of 
Directors, 2015). The Framework encourages a situated dialogue around the socio-cultural 
influences inherent in knowledge creation processes. As Nancy Foasberg (2015) notes,  
T]he Framework acknowledges that bias, privilege, and power are implicated in the 
production of information…to be information literate, a person not only must understand 
the process by which information is deemed “appropriate” but must also evaluate whether 
this process is a just one (pp. 708-9; italics added).       
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For our purposes then, the Framework is an ideal tool for examining the ways in which 
“bias, privilege and power” play in marginalizing the SAQ, and to “evaluate whether this process 
is a just one.” The Framework consists of six elements (ACRL Board of Directors 2015)6: 
Authority Is Constructed and Contextual 
This first frame encourages students to understand the bases of existing authority in terms 
of what constitutes a credible source, but also to be aware of the structural biases that can lead to 
the creation of authorities and the reproduction of conventional wisdom. This frame is 
ontological. 
Information Has Value 
The second Frame considers the multiple “dimensions of value” possessed by sources of 
information, and stresses that “value may be wielded by powerful interests in ways that 
marginalize certain voices” (p. 16). This frame is axiological. 
Research as Inquiry 
This Frame encourages the researcher to be open to “asking increasingly complex or new 
questions” as there may be open and unresolved questions involving disagreement and debate 
requiring “diverse disciplinary perspectives” (p. 18). This frame is epistemological. 
Information Creation as a Process 
This frame encourages the researcher to understand how purpose and intended audience(s) 
can help determine the format the information product will take, be it an article, chapter, news 
item, video, podcast or book. This frame is materialist. 
 
                                                 
6 The ACRL lists the Frames in alphabetical order, but they are arranged here to better represent a reasonably 
intuitive narrative of the research process, while acknowledging that such is never linear or consistent. Classification 
of the frames in terms of branches of philosophy and related concepts are original to the present author. 
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Searching as Strategic Exploration 
This Frame considers the strategic techniques involved research are both nonlinear and 
iterative, prompting successful researchers to look beyond a limited range of information sources 
and search terms. This frame is methodological. 
Scholarship as Conversation 
The student is made aware in this frame of how researchers and their outputs – peer-
reviewed articles, chapters, books, conferences etc. – contribute to a global conversation of shared 
and competing theories, perspectives and interpretations which evolve over time. This frame is 
dialogical. 
 
Analysis: Viewing Stratfordian Statements About the SAQ According to the ACRL 
Framework 
 
They clepe us drunkards and with swinish phrase soil our addition.  
- Hamlet, Act I, sc. iv 
 
Authority Is Constructed and Contextual  
 
Many of the pioneering Shakespeare scholars of the Eighteenth through early Twentieth 
Centuries (such as Sidney Lee, E.K. Chambers and Edmund Malone) were amateur historians, in 
the sense that they were not university professors: The professionalization of academic 
Shakespeare scholarship is a purely mid-20th Century invention (Rubinstein, 2010). Yet orthodox 
defenders of the Stratford tradition routinely cite their own authority as academics in order to 
downplay and dismiss the credentials and accomplishments of post-Stratfordians – and indeed to 
criticize the very idea of questioning authorities.  
This aversion to questioning authority is particularly evident in the writings of Paul 
Edmondson and Stanley Wells of the Shakespeare Birthplace Trust, who in the past decade 
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produced the book Shakespeare Beyond Doubt (2013) and the brief tract Shakespeare Bites Back 
(2011), as well as the website 60 Minutes With Shakespeare (intended to rebut the Oxfordian 
motion picture Anonymous [Emmerich 2011]) which consisted of -- in revealingly patronizing 
words -- “break[ing] down the assault on Shakespeare into soluble spoonfuls for the general 
public” (Edmondson & Leon, 2014, pp. 199). It must be stressed that the Trust is hardly a 
disinterested body, as it oversees a lucrative tourist and real estate enterprise that draws millions 
of people and generates millions of pounds to Stratford-Upon-Avon each year.   
Edmondson and Wells are particularly relentless in asserting their authority as experts and 
in defending orthodoxy. For example, in Shakespeare Beyond Doubt Edmondson states, “There 
is…the loaded assumption that even though one may lack the necessary knowledge and expertise, 
it is always acceptable to challenge or contradict a knowledgeable and expert authority. It is not” 
(p. 225). He adds that the debate demonstrates a “clash between the professional Shakespeare 
scholar and the anti-Shakespearean amateur. The former employs often highly specialized 
knowledge; the latter denies it” (p. 227). In both cases, Edmondson offers a loaded assumption of 
his own: that post-Stratfordians lack the necessary knowledge and expertise, and that that of the 
professional is “highly specialized.” In Shakespeare Bites Back Edmondson and Wells (2011) 
further assert, “[t]urning to historical facts without knowledge and understanding is dangerous 
and foolish. Anti-Shakespearian rhetoric seeks to convince those who fail to perceive the false 
premises on which it is based” (Edmondson & Wells, 2011, p. 12). Again, they declare that post-
Stratfordians lack knowledge, dismissing the thousands of books and articles contributed by 
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skeptics over more than a century and a half7. This also attributes bad faith (epistemic vice) to 
post-Stratfordians in that they are assumed to be deliberately misleading the gullible.  
This example highlights one of the most significant denials one encounters in the 
literature: that all Shakespeare scholars reject post-Stratfordian arguments, and the concomitant 
proposition that anyone who is a doubter is not a scholar. For example, Rosenblum (2017) states,  
On one point scholars agree: the William Shakespeare who wrote the plays and poems … 
was born in Stratford-upon-Avon in 1564, and died there fifty-two years later. Since the 
nineteenth century, various nonscholars have proposed dozens of alternative authors …. 
(p. xiv) 
Bruce Danner (2011) dismisses skeptics as a “group of amateur readers” who are “little 
more than sincere enthusiasts of Shakespeare” searching for “alternative Shakespeares with their 
own unaided and often underinformed efforts” (p. 157). In Shakespeare Bites Back, Edmondson 
and Wells (2011) also observe,  
We see...a disconnection between the professional historians and Shakespeare scholars on 
one side and well-educated non-specialists on the other. Our approach to the facts and 
historical evidence is complex and is informed by a deep knowledge in order to 
understand them (p. 34). 
These assertions ignore the fact that many post-Stratfordians are themselves degreed 
scholars. As of this writing (early 2020) the Shakespeare Authorship Coalition’s Declaration of 
Reasonable Doubt petition includes 736 academic signatories (Shakespeare Authorship 
Coalition). Yet Stratfordians often fall back on the idea that their “approach to the facts” is 
                                                 
7 While it is agreed that modern doubts about Shakespeare began with the 1848 book The Romance of Yachting (Hart, 
1848) there is substantial evidence that Shakespeare’s contemporaries were aware that there was a secret author 
behind the name. See Wildenthal 2019. 
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“complex” and uniquely informed in order to elevate their status as knowers while dismissing 
post-Stratfordian claims without actually addressing them. Such elitism is rather rich, given the 
orthodox habit of accusing skeptics of “snobbery” (Wildenthal 2019). 
As well – and contrary to the origins of Shakespeare scholarship – this conflation of 
credentials and institutional affiliation with authority erases the significant contribution of such 
independent scholars as Diana Price, whose Shakespeare’s Unorthodox Biography (2001) 
demonstrated the unique (and deadly) absence of any literary paper trail for William Shakspere 
that might have documented a writing career; Bonner Miller Cutting, whose numerous articles 
(collected in Necessary Mischief [2019]) look past conventional assumptions about the political 
and historical contexts of the Elizabethan era to reveal how startlingly unlikely Shakspere’s 
authorship would be; and Katherine Chiljan, whose book Shakespeare Suppressed (2011) lists 
over 90 “too early” contemporary references in Elizabethan literature to the works of 
Shakespeare, convincingly arguing that Shakspere would have been too young to have been the 
author.   
Yet these exclusions are not confined to claims of rarified expertise: Stratfordians – or the 
Shakespeare Birthplace Trust at any rate – position themselves as moral authorities as well. In 
responding to the “bully[ing]…antagonism generated by anti-Shakespearians” (Edmondson, 
2013, p. 227), the Trust makes the “deeply moral point” of condemning their “denial of evidence” 
(Edmondson and Wells, 2011, p. 19), claiming that its own online campaign against the film 
Anonymous constituted nothing less than “championing freedom and democracy” (Edmondson 
and Leon, 2014, p. 193).  
Summary: Where the ACRL Framework advises skepticism towards authority and 
recognizes that many different knowledge producers may be authoritative, Edmondson, Wells and 
18 
 
other leading Stratfordians condemn the questioning of authority, while redefining the category 
“scholar” to exclude all post-Stratfordians, whether they are university professors or independent 
researchers. That self-ascribed epistemic and moral authority triumphantly conjoined to suppress 
dissent should be vaunted as defending freedom and democracy – rather than being understood as 
being contrary to both – reveals a troubling illiberal undercurrent to this rhetoric. We are also 
instructed by the Framework to recognize authorities with conflicts of interest: In the case of 
Edmondson and Wells, it should be understood that their association with a lucrative 
Shakespeare-related tourist destination through the Shakespeare Birthplace Trust renders them as 
not disinterested observers. 
Information Has Value  
Following the release of the film Anonymous (Emmerich, 2011), the Shakespeare 
Birthplace Trust solicited essays that would be published in the 2013 book Shakespeare Beyond 
Doubt: Evidence, Argument, Controversy edited by Paul Edmondson and Stanley Wells 
(Edmondson and Wells, 2013). Edmondson is the Head of Research and Knowledge and Director 
of the Stratford-upon-Avon Poetry Festival for The Shakespeare Birthplace Trust, while Wells is 
the Trust’s Honorary President. Published by Cambridge University Press, the book was widely 
reviewed in respected journals (including in the Times Literary Supplement and SEL: Studies in 
English Literature 1500-1900), and is, as of this writing, held in 316 libraries around the world.  
In response, the Shakespeare Authorship Coalition produced their own collection of post-
Stratfordian essays entitled Shakespeare Beyond Doubt? Exposing an Industry in Denial, edited 
by John M. Shahan and Alexander Waugh (Shahan and Waugh, 2013). Shahan is the Chairman of 
the Shakespeare Authorship Coalition, while Waugh a writer and critic and the Coalition’s 
Honorary President. Published by Llumina Press, a self-publishing print-on-demand company, 
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their book was reviewed primarily in post-Stratfordian venues (e.g., Rubin, n.d.) and is held in 
only 33 libraries around the world.  
That two almost identically-titled books released in the same year met such different 
responses provides an excellent illustration of how structures of value serve to marginalize the 
SAQ: A major academic publisher releases an orthodox defense of the status quo sponsored by a 
not-disinterested British charity and achieves success through the conventional tools of the book 
trade including sales to libraries, while the dissident collection is self-published and barely 
noticed.8  
However, it must be stressed that this marginalization is not hidden or disguised – rather it 
is openly celebrated by orthodox scholars and journalists. As Canadian novelist and essayist 
Stephen Marche observed of the post-Stratfordians in the pages of the New York Times, “The 
problem is that not everybody does deserve a say. Just because an opinion exists does not mean 
that the opinion is worthy of respect. Some people deserve to be marginalized and excluded” 
(2011, para. 14).  
Summary: The ACRL Framework acknowledges that how information is valued in 
society can serve powerful interests while marginalizing other voices; as a consequence 
researchers should examine their own information privilege. In this case, current structures of 
value reinforce and reproduce the dominant narrative, to the approval of the orthodox.    
Research as Inquiry  
As we learned in the introduction to this chapter, some Stratfordian scholars admit that the 
extant documentation is scant, and that the entire enterprise of Shakespearean biography is highly 
problematic and replete with speculation (Danner, 2011; Ellis, 2014). However, for Danner, the 
                                                 
8 For a further discussion about the SAQ, libraries and the publishing industry, see Dudley 2015. 
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problem appears to be rooted in the scholars’ inability so far to construct a compelling biography, 
not in the actual impossibility of doing so on the basis of the available evidence; so for him the 
writings of post-Stratfordians are but “irrational fictions” (p. 145). For his part, Robert Sawyer, in 
his book Marlowe & Shakespeare: The Critical Rivalry (2017) compares the imaginative fictions 
of some Shakespeare biographers to the theories of 9/11 “Truthers;” yet scarcely a page later – 
and without a hint of self-awareness – calls anti-Stratfordians “our own version of the 9/11 
‘Truthers’” (p. 325). It does not seem to occur to Ellis, Danner or Sawyer that, if an absence of 
evidence is so complete it requires biographers to resort to fiction, then that probably indicates a 
need to be asking different questions, and to consider the life of that individual a matter of open 
inquiry. Yet, acknowledging the highly problematic nature of the evidence while still adhering to 
the dominant narrative is apparently the source of considerable cognitive dissonance.    
Of course, Sawyer’s remarks revisit the standard trope of comparing post-Stratfordians to 
conspiracy theorists, the assumption being that because all conspiracy theories are equally 
baseless, this makes them by definition unreasonable and eminently dismissible. Scott McCrea, in 
his The Case for Shakespeare: The End of the Authorship Question (2005) makes this explicit in 
his final chapter entitled, “All Conspiracy Theories are the Same” (p. 215-223). 
Edmondson and Wells begin their Shakespeare Beyond Doubt (2013) by referring to 
skeptics as anti-Shakespearians, a proposition that pejoratively labels the post-Stratfordian as 
“attacking” Shakespeare. More bewildering, however, is their argument that the term anti-
Stratfordian should be rejected because it “allows the work attributed to Shakespeare to be 
separated from the social and cultural context of its author” (p. 32). This is, of course sheer 
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sophistry to say nothing of circular reasoning: The debate over the identity of the author can’t 
presume the location in which the works were written.9  
More disingenuous reasoning arises in Edmondson’s and Wells’ Shakespeare Bites Back 
(2011). In referring to the more than 70 candidates that have been proposed over the centuries, 
they sweepingly assert that “all of these nominations are equally invalid; none has a greater claim 
than any of the others… all the suggestions rest on equally false premises (pp. 10-12).” This 
elides the reality that only a few of these candidates have any significant support at this point, or 
are the subjects of entire libraries’ worth of books as are Oxford, Bacon and Marlowe. The more 
significant problem here however, is that this is a highly fallacious and unsupportable statement: 
One cannot claim that all potential counterarguments are equally invalid without actually 
considering the evidence for each.  
More fallacious attempts to dismiss the possibility of alternative candidates are espoused 
by other scholars. Joseph Rosenblum, in his chapter on the SAQ in his reference work The 
Definitive Shakespeare Companion declares that “no evidence [for other candidates] can exist.” 
As I noted in my review of this chapter,  
It’s one thing to argue that the available evidence fails to meet the burden of proof, or is 
insufficiently compelling. It’s even acceptable to argue that no such evidence may ever be 
found. But it’s quite another to declare, with the omniscience usually reserved for deities, 
the absolute non-existence of something which, all things being equal, could quite 
reasonably and conceivably exist (Dudley, 2018, p. 18). 
Furthermore, Edmondson and Wells (2011) appeal to false analogies when they “scorn 
any anti-Shakespearian argument which begins with the formulation, ‘Shakespeare couldn’t have 
                                                 
9 In any case, claims for the presence of Warwickshire dialect in the canon do not withstand scrutiny (Barber 2018).    
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written the works because…’ This is the equivalent to saying ‘how could the world possibly be 
round because our eyes tell us that it is flat?’” (p. 35). These propositions are, both in form and 
content, completely incomparable and once again serve to equate a debate over historical 
evidence to patent irrationality.  
From the perspective of virtue epistemology, Stratfordians appear to be positively terrified 
of the Authorship Question, which they characterize as “ultimately a dangerous phenomenon 
which can lead to conspiratorial narratives fueled by denials of historical evidence” (Edmondson 
& Wells (2013, p. 235), as well as being “an entirely parasitic phenomenon, attacking the truth in 
order to feed off its life-blood…attach[ing] itself, leech-like, to a healthy body” (2011, p. 25). 
Indeed, in the view of Stanley Wells, “it is dangerous and immoral to question history” (as quoted 
in Waugh 2018). In the face of such a terrible threat, those who profess to have an “open mind” 
must hold ulterior motives (Edmondson, 2013, p. 226). 
Summary: Where the ACRL Framework encourages the researcher to regard gaps in 
information within fields of inquiry as an opportunity to ask deeper and more complex questions, 
and to consider these as unresolved matters requiring an open mind, most Stratfordian scholars 
display dogmatic resolve to ignore or explain away such gaps. The mere act of asking questions is 
pathologized, as is the disposition towards keeping an open mind.   
Information Creation as a Process  
It is a common criticism levelled against post-Stratfordians that they don’t subject their 
theories to peer review in academic journals as do ordinary scholars. The reality is that those few 
who do manage to get their work published in mainstream Shakespeare journals only do so 
because they self-censor their positions on the SAQ from their work (Waugaman, 2014). Having 
long been systematically shut out of conventional peer-reviewed journals and conferences, post-
23 
 
Stratfordians are increasingly turning to the Web to publish their research and commentary in a 
wide range of formats, including newsletters, blogs, videos and podcasts (Shapiro, 2010, p. 8). 
Here one can find a rich vitality of production, including the Shakespeare Authorship Coalition’s 
online campaign the Declaration of Reasonable Doubt, the journals and newsletters of the 
Shakespeare Oxford Fellowship including Brief Chronicles and The Oxfordian, Keir Cutler’s 
entertaining YouTube videos, the Shakespeare Oxford Fellowship’s Don’t Quill the Messenger 
podcasts and Hank Whittemore’s methodical list of “100 Reasons Why Oxford Was 
Shakespeare” (Whittemore, 2011). 
It is generally underappreciated that the Web and digital archives and repositories in 
particular have greatly accelerated the progress on research on the authorship of Shakespeare by 
making globally available historical documents that were once physically confined to libraries 
and archives, and therefore only accessible to a few dedicated researchers (Waugh, 2014). Still, 
the response from orthodox scholars has been to dismiss such contributions, and indeed the 
formats themselves. Matt Kubus, in his chapter in Shakespeare Beyond Doubt (2013) derides the 
“democratization” of the authorship discussion online, stating that “the blogs of the amateur are 
an ideal platform for those unusually extreme cases for Shakespeare authorship” (p. 59). One 
would have thought that the 2014 anthology Shakespeare and the Digital World: Redefining 
Scholarship and Practice edited by Christie Carson and Peter Kirwan would have been an 
appropriate place to have acknowledged the legitimacy of these venues and the work of post-
Stratfordians, as it dealt with digital formats such as open-access journals, blogs, online courses 
and e-texts relating to Shakespeare studies. However, Kirwan (2014) only mentions post-
Stratfordian websites in passing and derisively as “conspiracy hubs” (p. 61). In what must have 
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been a deliberate decision on the part of the editors, no reference is made to online post-
Stratfordian knowledge production (Carson & Kirwan, 2014).  
Summary: Where the ACRL Framework recognizes that purpose and intended audience 
can result in a wide range of formats – some of them new and emergent – but that researchers 
should not equate the product with any underlying creation processes, we see in the mainstream 
rejection of digital information produced by post-Stratfordians both the blanket dismissal of these 
formats and invidious assumptions about underlying processes, i.e., conspiracy theories. 
Searching as Strategic Exploration  
The nature and scale of publications related to post-Stratfordian theories – especially 
concerning the candidacy of Edward de Vere, 17th Earl of Oxford – have been particularly robust 
for the past 20 years. Examples include such notable books as Shakespeare’s Unorthodox 
Biography (Price, 2001), Shakespeare by Another Name (Anderson, 2005) and Shakespeare 
Suppressed (Chiljan, 2011).  
However, recent Stratfordian books seeking to debunk post-Stratfordian theories have 
conspicuously avoided referring to any of these publications, instead revisiting well-worn paths of 
ridicule directed at 19th Century skeptics, notably Delia Bacon. The bibliography in Shakespeare 
Beyond Doubt (2013) confirms that Edmondson and Wells managed to ignore a half-century 
worth of relevant literature, while Joseph Rosenblum’s chapter on the SAQ in his Definitive 
Shakespeare Companion (2017) relies heavily on orthodox and dated work: in addition to Shapiro 
(2010), and Edmondson and Wells (2013), he cites books published in the 1950s and 60s, with 
only one – The Shakespeare Controversy, by Warren Hope and Kim Holston (1992) – being from 
an Oxfordian viewpoint, and several decades old at that. An undergraduate paper with such a 
dated and one-sided bibliography would likely receive a failing grade. Such omissions can hardly 
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be accidental and attest to the inability of leading Stratfordians to respond in good faith to the 
weakness of their own position.  
Summary: Where the ACRL Framework states that experienced scholars look beyond a 
limited range of sources, we see in the work of orthodox defenders of the Stratford myth a studied 
reliance on older publications and what must be a deliberate strategic decision to ignore recent 
relevant scholarship.  
Scholarship as Conversation  
In his 2010 book Contested Will, James Shapiro offers a rare mainstream admission that 
the academy has “walled off” the SAQ from mainstream scholarship, and enforces this “taboo” by 
shutting out post-Stratfordians from scholarly journals (Shapiro, 2010, pp. 3, 8). In 2014, a 
scholarly controversy that made international news illustrates this gatekeeping in action: The 
Italian journal Memoria di Shakespeare was preparing for a special issue on the biography of 
Shakespeare to be published the following year, when one of the accepted articles was 
subsequently rejected. The article in question, “The Psychology of Shakespearean Biography” by 
Oxfordian Richard Waugaman, explored the phenomenon of the taboo against the SAQ and the 
unflattering socio-psychological reasons why Stratfordians so rigorously enforce it (see 
Waugaman, 2014). It had originally been received by the editors as “absolutely pertinent” to the 
issue; however, following the departure of the editors, one of the new editors Gary Taylor – 
professor at Florida State University and co-editor on the then-in-progress New Oxford 
Shakespeare10 – decided to reject the article, calling it “profoundly unscholarly” and compared it 
to Holocaust denial. When Waugaman took offence, Taylor responded,  
                                                 
10 In this edition of the plays, Taylor and his co-editors caused considerable controversy of their own with their 
dubious claims that up to 40% of the text of the canon was written by other contemporaries of Shakespeare. See 
Dudley, Goldstein and Maycock, 2017.   
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I compared it to the work of Holocaust-deniers not because the damage to Shakespeare is 
comparable to the damage to the millions of people killed by the Nazis, but because 
Waugaman’s work depends upon the same kind of conspiratorial claims. You cannot 
reason with such claims, because they dismiss empirical evidence as just another 
conspiracy. The idea that anti-Stratfordian zealots are ‘censored’ is ridiculous (Reisz, 
2014, pp. 10-11).  
Elsewhere however, such censorship of post-Stratfordians is openly acknowledged and 
celebrated. At Wikipedia, tightly-controlled gatekeeping of Shakespeare-related content by the 
editors – primarily the self-appointed Tom Reedy – results in the swift deletion of any post-
Stratfordian edits. As a result, Wikipedia’s Shakespeare pages “tend[] towards orthodoxy, 
favoring traditional, authorized positions” (Moberly, 2018, 91). As Mark Anderson recounts, 
initially Wikipedia’s “Shakespeare Authorship Question” article was reasonably balanced, with 
two editors – one Stratfordian, the other an Oxfordian – working together cooperatively. This 
collegial atmosphere ended in 2009 when Reedy and another anonymous Stratfordian took over 
the page to give it a decidedly Stratfordian perspective, initiating a dispute that saw the Oxfordian 
editor banned from the article (Anderson, 2011). In the closing pages of Shakespeare Beyond 
Doubt Edmondson and Wells commend Reedy as an “unsung hero” for spending “countless hours 
ensuring that the site remains fact rather than faith based” (Edmondson & Wells 2013, 240).   
Summary: Where the ACRL Framework encourages researchers to regard fields of 
inquiry as open and contested, requiring ongoing negotiation and conversation between scholars, 
Stratfordians brook no conversation that does not adhere to the parameters of the orthodox 






According to most mainstream scholarship and media analysis, the Shakespeare 
Authorship Question is a dangerous fringe belief held by zealots, snobs and conspiracy theorists, 
a growing symptom of our “post-truth” age and comparable to flat-Earth beliefs and Holocaust 
denial. As such, it may be dismissed and ignored, or only cited to be rebutted. Any gaps in the 
evidence for – and our understandings of – Shakespeare may be explained away by documents 
being lost to history (e.g., Shakespeare’s “lost years”) or else the “miracle” of genius and 
imagination. 
However, when viewed through the theoretical lens of epistemic virtue and measured 
against an external standard of robust research practices and dispositions in the form of the ACRL 
Framework for Information Literacy for Higher Education, this rhetoric is revealed to constitute a 
pattern of epistemic vice and oppression, and as such is quite incompatible with sound scholarship 
and pedagogy.  
The Frame Authority Is Constructed and Contextual demonstrates that Stratfordians 
espouse – indeed, demand – an uncritical acceptance of authority, namely their own. The very act 
of questioning their authority is viewed with suspicion and contempt. Post-Stratfordians are 
consistently rejected as reliable speakers and suffer testimonial injustice (Fricker, 2007) as a 
result, in favour of these traditional authorities – many of whom have strong vested interests in 
the maintenance of the status quo.  
Information Has Value reveals the extent to which current structures and practices in 
scholarly publishing lend unwarranted value to Stratfordian voices while shutting out post-
Stratfordians, and this marginalization is met with unreflexive approval. As a result, the academy 
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and the mass media reinforce and faithfully reproduce the dominant narrative, thereby 
maintaining the epistemological system (Dotson 2014) of orthodox Shakespeare studies.   
Furthermore, Searching as Strategic Exploration demonstrates the willfully anemic 
sourcing of leading Stratfordian publications, as the result of apparent decisions not to cite recent 
post-Stratfordian scholarship. These lapses are consistent with Kidd’s notions of poor epistemic 
conduct, e.g., deliberately ignoring evidence (Kidd, 2016); and Information Creation as a Process 
shows how these mechanisms of exclusion extend across all formats. In the words of Husting and 
Orr (2007), these practices “perform boundary maintenance” in Shakespeare studies such that 
“certain ways of knowing, thinking, and talking about power are encouraged while others are 
rendered abnormal” (p. 144) – processes referred to by Sullivan (2000) as “forum control.” 
Most significantly, Research as Inquiry exposes Stratfordian scholarship as a closed, 
circular system of inquiry dominated by logical fallacies, resolutely shutting itself off from 
potentially fruitful pathways of investigation. The ubiquitous accusation of “conspiracy theory” is 
clearly a “mechanism of exclusion” designed to “pre-empt[] the scholarly and investigation 
process” (Husting & Orr, 2007, pp. 131; 146).  
Finally, Scholarship as Conversation depicts an academic community deviating from 
standard collegial practice by actively excluding post-Stratfordians from the scholarly 
conversation. Instead of a praxis of epistemic humility, Stratfordian scholars and opinion-makers 
adopt a stance of unapologetic triumphalism. The oppressions faced by post-Stratfordians as a 
consequence are very real: their academic freedom infringed upon, their work is excluded from 
mainstream books and journals in Shakespeare studies, and their career choices and opportunities 
are circumscribed accordingly. The effects become intergenerational: as Oxfordian Wally Hurst 
notes, their movement is “too old, too white and too male” (Hurst, 2018). Without institutional 
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and cultural infrastructure – especially an education system that reproduces post-Stratfordian 
knowledge – it is primarily those who are already epistemologically privileged in other aspects of 
their lives that have the resources to be engaged in the issue, and then only with other like-minded 
scholars in purpose-built venues.  
In short, these rhetorics of exclusion demonstrate a pronounced degree of bad faith on the 
part of many orthodox scholars and media opinion-makers, representing a consistent pattern of 
epistemic vice resulting in epistemic injustice and oppression against post-Stratfordian doubters.  
Yet, the costs of these vice-charges are not borne wholly by their intended targets: As 
Fricker (2007) argues, the mainstream perpetrators of epistemic injustice themselves become its 
victims by growing arrogant and “closed-minded, dogmatic, blithely impervious to criticism, etc.” 
and in so doing deprive themselves of knowledge they might have otherwise pursued (p. 20). 
Ultimately then, this rhetoric does not just foreclose the academic freedom of post-Stratfordians, 
it limits the thinkable and sayable for everyone who cares about Shakespeare, including 
Stratfordians themselves. To paraphrase Macbeth, this even-handed injustice commends the 
ingredients of their poison'd chalice to their own lips. 
Conclusion: Towards Epistemic Humility and Creative Inquiry in the SAQ 
Orthodox Shakespeare scholarship is the history of shackled thought, of brainwashed 
intellect, of curtailed curiosity.  It makes one long for the day, perhaps not far off, when 
the full intellectual potential of Shakespeare scholars will be unleashed, liberated from 
conscious and unconscious constraints imposed by the authorship orthodoxy. 
– Richard Waugaman11 
                                                 
11 Waugaman 2008, 8. 
30 
 
The suppression of research and pedagogy concerning the authorship of the works of 
Shakespeare represents a significant but under-examined example of a threat to academic freedom 
originating from within the academy, but also one with significant support from many major 
media outlets. In exploring this systemic infringement of academic freedom, this chapter has 
portrayed a scholarly mainstream whose campaign to delegitimize and foreclose legitimate lines 
of inquiry has necessitated confining itself to an epistemological prison, because it refuses to 
broaden either its scope of inquiry or its community of scholars. It demonstrates the extent to 
which any field of inquiry has the potential to become so comfortable and complacent with its 
paradigmatic assumptions that it risks arrogance, ossification and the loss of innovation.  
To transcend or avoid patterns of epistemic injustice and ensure the internal maintenance 
academic freedom, scholars should aspire to what Alfonso Montuori refers to as creative inquiry: 
a rejection of the industrial-age ethos of “reproductive education” in which students are merely 
expected to consume and repeat knowledge provided by experts who are certain about their own 
certainties, to instead embrace uncertainty, complexity and the realization of all we do not know. 
Montuori argues that such an “ignorance-based worldview” requires “an attitude of 
epistemological humility, a starting point of not-knowing and wonder” (p. 67). 
Instead of condemning the “zealotry” of “anti-Shakespeareans” and barring them from 
participating in the scholarly conversation, the Shakespeare academy needs to welcome post-
Stratfordians as fellow Shakespeareans, joined together in their shared passion for the plays and 
poems and a desire to pass their love to the next generation. The Shakespeare professoriate needs 
to grant academic freedom equally to post-Stratfordians and to themselves, instead of fatally 
circumscribing their own investigations and those of their colleagues and students. Only then can 
31 
 
the study of this magnificent, brilliant and timeless author become a creative inquiry, filled with 
wonder and possibility. 
 
The grace of Shakespeare is that there is always another side to things; there is always 
doubt. 
-- Jennifer Michael Hecht12 
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